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Risk Analysis for Container Shipping: From a Logistics Perspective  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade in the container shipping business, the issue of risk has attracted 
considerable attention in academia. Previous studies addressed various types of risk in 
relation to container shipping, e.g., technical risk, market risk, business risk, and operational 
risk (Ewert, 2008). Technical risk refers generally to loss arising from activities such as ship 
or equipment design and engineering, manufacturing, technological processes, and test 
procedures. In the shipping industry, market risk includes revenue and investment risk 
(Kavussanos et al., 2003); this refers to unforeseen and detrimental changes in demand and 
supply (Rodrigue et al., 2011). Business risk relates to the nature of the business and it “deals 
with such matters as future prices, sales or the cost of inputs” (Yip and Lun, 2009, p.153). In 
container shipping operation, the main business risk relates to the action of increasing 
capacity so as to take advantage of economies of scale (Yip and Lun, 2009). Operational risk 
is “the possibility of an event associated with the focal firm that may affect the firm’s internal 
ability to produce goods and services, quality and timeliness of production, and/or the 
profitability of the company” (Manuj et al., 2008, p.139).  Essentially, this arises from the 
logistics processes.  
 
Within this complex picture of risk in container shipping, this paper attempts to address one 
group of these risks - the operational risk. Container shipping involves multiple entities 
including shippers, forwarders, hauliers, terminal operators, and shipping companies. The 
complex operations within and between these entities and the long distance of physical 
process may give rise to various types of operational risks, which could negatively impact on 
the performance of container shipping companies. In order to tackle this issue, it is important 
for shipping companies to know what these risks are and how they affect the shipping 
operations. Unless there is an unlimited resource, which could be employed to mitigate the 
risks, shipping companies will always have to prioritise their resources to mitigate those risks 
which are most imminent and significant. This makes it important to analyse the extent to 
which each risk affects a shipping company’s performance and to identify the relative 
importance of each risk factor.  
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With regard to the operational risk in container shipping, a number of studies need to be 
mentioned. Drewry (2009) identified a list of business process risks and asset risks in 
container transport and logistics. These included documentation, booking and invoicing 
errors, errors in customs regulatory compliance and in security compliance, strikes and 
transport congestions, theft and cargo loss or damage, piracy, and terrorist attacks. Based on 
the micro-data of individual vessel accidents which occurred in America from 1981 to 1989, 
Talley (1996) found that unlicensed operators (versus licensed operators) and smaller ship 
size (versus large ship size) contributed to the increase of risk and severity of cargo damage 
in container shipping. He also suggested that the risks and severity of damage are greater in 
collision and fire/explosion incidents than in groundings. Tseng et al. (2012) analysed the 
risks of cargo damage for aquatic products of refrigerated containers based on a questionnaire 
survey in various maritime communities in Taiwan, including container carriers, ocean 
freight forwarders, and container terminal operators. They found that “container data setting 
errors” is the top factor of both perceived risk and severity of risk. 
 
Fu et al. (2010) reported that piracy has been a significant threat which forced several major 
container liners to alter their service routes. They focused on the Far East-Europe container 
liner shipping service and proposed a simulation-related economic model using history data 
to explain the impact of piracy. Inappropriate empty container repositioning could incur 
significant costs to shipping lines (Song and Dong, 2011) and it is thus considered as a risk in 
container shipping. Song et al. (2005) stated that empty container transportation incurred 
approximately USD 15 billion for the world containership fleet in 2002. Drewry (2006) 
reported that empty containers have accounted for at least 20 per cent of global port handling 
activity ever since 1998. The service schedule’s unreliability is also a risk factor in container 
shipping since it could lead to transportation delays and affect shipping companies’ 
reputations.  Notteboom (2006) investigated the sources of schedule unreliability on the East 
Asia-Europe route and identified several sources which led to the service schedule’s 
unreliability, including waiting time and delays caused by port strikes, unstable weather and 
sea conditions, port/terminal/transport congestion, and port/terminal productivity being below 
expectations. Qi and Song (2012) pointed out that the lack of appropriately designed flexible 
liner service schedules would lead to service unreliability. Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) 
used a cost model to simulate the impact of bunker cost changes on the operational costs of 
liner services. The results showed that oil price rise may force shipping lines to reduce speed 
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which may increase their operational costs and operational risks. Yang (2010; 2011) 
investigated the impact of the container security initiative (CSI) on Taiwan’s shipping 
industry. The CSI is a programme imposed by US after 9/11, which requires that an inbound 
container or cargo from foreign commercial ports be pre-inspected in order to strengthen the 
US nation security.  They identified several CSI-related risk factors including “cargo cannot 
make a shipment on time and shut out by customs authority”, “cargo handling time delay”, 
“longer lead time of data entering”, and “various transmission systems”. It was reported that 
“cargo cannot be shipped on time and is shut out by the customs authority” is the top CSI-
related factor in terms of risk severity. 
 
The above studies have provided a valuable insight into the operational risks faced by 
container ship companies in their operations. However, each of these studies has only focused 
on one or several operational risk factors and no studies have inclusively examined all the 
possible operational risks faced by a container shipping company and evaluated the relative 
importance of each of them. Indeed, such a study would be useful as when the attainable 
resources are limited, the shipping company will have to make a decision on how to mitigate 
its operational risks more strategically and efficiently. Obviously, more investment should be 
made on mitigating those risks that are of great significance and less investment on those of 
less significance.  
 
Against this background, the authors conducted a comprehensive study of the risks a 
container shipping company may face in providing services in shipping supply chains; this 
paper reports on the research process and research findings of that study. The study aimed at 
answering two questions; one is what are the risk factors in container shipping operations, 
and the other is which risk factors are relatively more significant than the others in a shipping 
company. By answering these two questions, it is hoped that the study will provide a clear 
insight into the totality of the operational risks faced by a shipping company,i and assist the 
shipping company managers in making better and more strategic risk mitigation decisions.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the research methods 
used in this study. Section 3 includes data collection and analysis, and the research results. In 
Section 4, a discussion is conducted along with an explanation of this paper’s contribution.  
Finally Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
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2. Research Methods  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, in order to answer the two research questions presented in Section 
1, three research steps were taken, namely, “risk identification”, “risk measurement”, and 
“risk analysis”. “Risk identification” was purposed to answer the first research question. A 
thorough literature review was first conducted to identify all the risk factors addressed in 
previous studies; and an interview survey was then conducted to validate the results obtained 
from the literature review and to identify additional risk factors. Research Question 2 was 
approached through “risk measurement” and “risk analysis”. “Risk measurement” was 
conducted based on a questionnaire survey with five-point Likert scale; and “risk analysis” 
was conducted by ranking the scale of each risk factor and mapping them to explore their 
relative significance. A more detailed description of these steps will be presented later in this 
section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The structure of research methodology 
Source: the Authors 
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This study used the Taiwan container shipping industry as a case study. Because of its island 
geography, Taiwan relies heavily on international trade and most of the manufacturing 
materials are imported by ships. According to official statistics (Ministry of Transportation 
and Communications, 2011), around 99% of Taiwan’s international trades are transported by 
sea. Obviously, the shipping industry plays a very important role in Taiwan’s economy. It is 
thus believed that a case study of Taiwan can provide useful insight into the risk issues in a 
wider maritime context, and the findings obtained through the case study should be generally 
applicable to other countries where container shipping also plays an important role in the 
economies.   
 
In order to identify and analyse the risks faced by a container shipping company in their 
operations in an inclusive and integrated manner, the study approached the issue from a 
logistics point of view, that is to view and analyse the risks from the perspective of three 
major flows in maritime logistics operations - information flow, physical flow, and payment 
flow. Information flow refers to large collection and transfer of information/knowledge 
between manufacturers, transportation companies, and retailers and customers (Paixão and 
Marlow, 2003; Spekman and Davis, 2004; Creazza et al., 2010).  Physical flow refers to the 
transfer of goods including raw materials, finished goods, and return/recycle products from 
the business sector to the customer sector (Paixão and Marlow, 2003; Spekman and Davis, 
2004; Creazza et al., 2010).  Payment flow refers to monetary payments from the customer 
sector to the business sector (Lambert et al., 1998; Spekman and Davis, 2004). It is 
reasonable to believe that approaching from the perspective of these three flows would cover 
all the elements in shipping companies’ operations and thus the possible risks associated with 
these operation elements would be inclusively identified given that a sound research method 
will be used. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the logistics flows amongst the relevant entities in container shipping 
business whereby are included the three flows and multiple entities such as shipping 
company, other transport companies, agency related companies, consigner, consignee, and 
bank. The information flow starts from the consignee who connects with the consignor for 
the trade and with other entities for the cargo transportation. Other entities also connect with 
each other by means of information flows. The physical flow starts from the consignor 
through transport companies and shipping company to the consignee. In terms of payment 
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flow, the consignor and/or the consignee pay the transportation fee to agency related 
companies, transport companies, and the shipping company. The consignee also pays the 
cargo fee to the consignor through the international banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The three flows in container shipping services 
Source: the Authors 
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flows, and they are referred to as risks associated with information flow, risks associated with 
physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow. 
  
Following the above step, in order to validate whether the risks addressed in the broad range 
of literature are applicable to container shipping and whether there are any other risks that 
have not been addressed in literature but exist in practice and should therefore be included in 
the study, we conducted face-to-face interviews in late 2011 with a number of container 
shipping company managers (Section 3.2). A major advantage of using face-to-face interview 
is that we can obtain richer and more clarified insight into the issue of concern from the 
interviewees, which may not be attainable from a quantitative survey. As Water (2007) 
suggested, when the risks are unclear and complex, to clarify the ambiguity, interview is 
perhaps the most suitable way to collect new information from the people who are most 
familiar with conditions. Notably, this survey method has been also used in several previous 
studies addressing similar topics; e.g. Yang (2011) used this method in his study to validate 
and identify security risk factors in Taiwan’s maritime supply chain; Jüttner et al. (2003) 
used this method to confirm supply chain risk management strategies identified from existing 
literature and identify additional strategies.  
 
The interviews were conducted with seven senior managers from two shipping companies. 
Although only two companies were selected, it is reasonable to believe that the findings 
obtained from the interviews with the managers therefrom are valid and reliable. This is 
because that these two companies are among the top 3 shipping companies in Taiwan and top 
25 in the world in terms of company size and market share. Notably, the container shipping 
industry is an oligopoly industry; according to Alphaliner (2013), the top 25 shipping 
companies occupy almost 60% of the shipping market in the world. Views expressed by the 
mangers in two of these companies should, to a good extent, be able to represent the views of 
the industry.  
 
In order to obtain a balanced view from different professional areas, the invited interviewees 
consisted of two information managers, two vice presidents and three senior operation 
managers. Open questions were used in the interview, and the interviewees were asked to 
comment on a list of identified risk elements and factors. They were also asked to add the risk 
factors which they had noted in practice and believed ought to be included in the list.   
8 
 
 
Risk Measurement  
 
Generally, risk measurement is conducted quantitatively using two factors - risk likelihood 
and risk consequences (Mitchell, 1995; Waters, 2007; Cox, 2008; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2008). Risk likelihood is the probability that a risk caused by a risk-source will occur (Elky, 
2006), and risk consequence is the outcome or the potential outcome of a risk event (NPSA, 
2008). By multiplying the risk likelihood with the relevant risk consequence, the risk scale 
will be obtained (Cox, 2008; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011).  
 
In order to identify and measure the level of likelihood and consequence of the risks faced by 
shipping companies, we conducted a large scale questionnaire survey using a five-point 
Likert scale. This survey used the entire population of the shipping companies registered with 
the National Association of Shipping Agencies. At the time of conducting the project, there 
were a total of 116 container shipping companies in the Directory of National Association of 
Chinese Ship Owners and Shipping Agencies As there are three major departments 
(Information/Documentation, Operation, and Finance) in each company that are closely 
related to the identified risks, the potential effective population size was 342 assuming there 
was one manager in each department in each company.  Section 3 presents details of the data 
collected through this survey.  
 
Normally, the value of likelihood is described by a number between 0 and 1; however, many 
studies (e.g. NPSA, 2008) used five abstractive categories to describe the probability of an 
event. These were: very low (or impossible; rare), low (or unlikely), medium (or occasional; 
possible), high (or frequent; likely), and very high (or almost certain). This paper uses 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 to represent “rare”, “unlikely”, “possible”, “likely”, and “almost 
certain” respectively (e.g. Yang, 2010).  
 
Risk consequences are normally measured in financial or monetary terms, e.g., clearly, a lost 
load of goods clearly a monetary value. However, in some cases it is not that straightforward, 
e.g., owing to the intangible characteristics of the consequence, it is difficult to measure a 
delayed delivery in monetary terms. In risk analysis, reputation loss (Bebbington et al., 2008) 
is considered normally as a non-financial loss. In container shipping operations, some types 
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of safety (Kasperson et al., 1988; IMO, 2009) and security damage (Tzannatos, 2003; IMO, 
2009) (e.g. pain and suffering of the crew and their family) are of the characteristics of non-
financial loss. This paper considers three types of risk consequences. These are, namely, 
financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss. It is worth 
pointing out that these risk consequences are not totally exclusive and independent of each 
other; there are overlaps. An incident such as cargo loss may cause financial loss; at the same 
time, it may also cause reputation loss. It is the same with safety and security incident related 
loss - a piracy attach is very much likely to cause financial loss. However, there are still 
differences; for example, safety and security incident related loss normally may cause pain 
and suffering of the crew of the ship involved in the incident and their families; this cannot be 
measured by financial terms and thus categorised as financial loss. To establish a more 
clarified and comprehensive overview of the significance of each risk, it is necessary to 
separate the three types of consequence and use them as three perspectives of the analysis. 
 
The level of risk consequence is described in different ways. Some scholars use “negligible, 
minor, moderate, serious, and critical” (e.g., Garvey and Lansdowne, 1998; NPSA, 2008), 
some used “no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic” (e.g., Cox, 2008), 
and some use “low, moderate, and high” (e.g. Elky, 2006). In this study, “insignificant, minor, 
moderate, major, and catastrophic” represented by 1 to 5 respectively are used to describe the 
level of risk consequence. 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
Based on the data collected through the above steps, we calculated the risk scale of each risk 
factor and then used a risk map to compare their relative importance. Before entering into a 
detailed discussion on how to calculate risk scales, we introduce the notations below - 
 
 M : the total number of risk factors 
 N : the total number of respondents 
 lri: the likelihood of risk factor r  by the respondent, i, 1≤r≤M and 1≤i≤N. 
 cri : the consequence of risk factor  r by the respondent, i, 1≤r≤M and 1≤i≤N.  
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Note that the risk scale is the product of the likelihood and the consequence of a risk factor. 
Two methods could be used to calculate the risk scale over multiple respondents. The first 
method is to multiply the average likelihood over all respondents with the average 
consequence over all respondents for each risk factor. We refer this method as Risk Scale 
Average Likelihood and Consequence (RSALC) in this paper. The formula is as follows -    
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑟 =  𝑙?̅? * 𝑐?̅? 
 
Where 
𝑙?̅? =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑙𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  and  𝑐?̅? =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
The second method is to first obtain the risk scale for each individual respondent on each risk 
factor, and then calculate the average of those risk scales over all respondents. We call this 
method Average Risk Scale (ARS) in this paper. The formula is as follows -   
 
 𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑟 =  
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑙𝑟𝑖 ∗  𝑐𝑟𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
The first method provides three pieces of results for each risk factor, i.e. average likelihood, 
average consequence, and risk scale. It is easy to apply and the results can be shown directly 
in the risk map in which all these results are required. However, a drawback of using this 
method is that the final result of RSALC includes those components obtained by multiplying 
one respondent’s likelihood with another respondent’s consequence. This may distort the 
statistic results. 
 
We believe that the second method - ARS - is more reasonable in calculating risk scales since 
they are obtained firstly by multiplying the risk likelihood with the risk consequence from 
each respondent respectively, and then averaging over all respondents. We therefore use this 
method to evaluate the risk scale for each risk factor. 
 
Notably, ARS provides only the result of risk scale over all respondents and it does not 
provide the corresponding risk likelihood and risk consequence. In order to solve this 
problem, this paper employs a method based on the concept of the shortest distance. It 
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considers a two-dimension state space in which the x-axis represents the risk likelihood and 
the y-axis represents the risk consequence.  Each respondent can be represented by a point in 
the state space. The distance between any two points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) is given by 𝐷 =
 √(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)2 + (𝑦2 − 𝑦1)2. Our purpose is to find the best pair of likelihood and 
consequence, the product of which is equal to ARS, whilst the corresponding point has the 
shortest total distance to all respondents.   
 
Let 𝑙𝑟 be the candidate risk likelihood, and ?̂?𝑟 be the candidate risk consequence. For a given 
risk factor r, the total distance between (𝑙𝑟,?̂?𝑟) and (𝑙𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑟𝑖) for 1≤i≤N can be formulated as -  
𝐷𝑟 =  ∑ √(𝑙𝑟 − 𝑙𝑟𝑖)2 + (?̂?𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
          1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑀 
The objective is to seek the optimal (𝑙𝑟,?̂?𝑟) for 1≤r≤M by solving the following constrained 
optimisation problem,  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐷 = ∑ 𝐷𝑟
𝑀
𝑟=1
= ∑ ∑ √(𝑙𝑟 − 𝑙𝑟𝑖)2 + (?̂?𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑟=1
 
Subject to  
𝑙𝑟 ∗  ?̂?𝑟 = 𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑟 , 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑀 
The above optimisation problem can be solved easily by using existing software tools, e.g. 
Excel solver. After obtaining the best (𝑙𝑟,?̂?𝑟) for 1≤r≤M, we are able to perform further risk 
analysis using the risk maps in the next section. 
 
3. Data Collection, Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
3.1 Risk Identification  
 
As described in Section 2, risk identification is conducted through two steps; the first one is 
identification of risks through review of existing literature, and the second is validation of 
data through interviews. 
 
3.1.1 Risk Identification through a Review of Previous Literature  
  
Risks associated with Information Flow  
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The risk factors associated with information flow, which have been addressed in previous 
studies, may be grouped into three categorisations: information delay, information 
inaccuracy, and IT problem.  
 
According to Ramayah and Omar (2010), information delay and inaccurate information 
means poor information quality. They also pointed out that lack of advanced information 
technology (IT) may be a cause of poor information quality. Angulo et al. (2004, p.102) 
stated that information delay was an important risk element in information flow; they defined 
it as “the wait time that shared information experiences before it is used by an internal supply 
chain functions”. Metters (1997, p. 99) explained that “lack of inter-company communication 
combined with large time-lags between receipt and transmission of information are the root 
cause of information delay”.  
 
With regard to information inaccuracy, DeLone and McLean (1992) pointed out that it might 
lead to wrong decision making. Sharma and Gupta (2002), Finch (2004), and Qi and Zhang 
(2008) suggested that lack of information security might affect information accuracy since it 
could lead to the transferring data being tampered with or leaked. Angulo et al. (2004) stated 
that using inaccurate information might lead to costly investment and work inefficiencies and 
it might be caused by customer’s poor inventory integrity. Forrester (1961) and Lee et al. 
(1997) found that information asymmetry or lack of communication could lead to inaccurate 
or distorted information flow in a supply chain. Husdal and Bråthen (2010) identified several 
risks relating to information flow in the context of Norwegian freight transport; these risks 
are: disregard of rules and regulations, wrong or erroneous lading permits, wrong or 
erroneous documents (e.g. customs declaration), and wrong or erroneous information from or 
to other players in the supply chain. 
 
A number of studies addressed the importance of IT. Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) 
suggested that lack of necessary IT or IT failure ought to be considered as an important risk 
element associated with information flow since they might disrupt the process of information 
transmission. They stated that the triggers that might cause system risks include information 
infrastructure breakdowns, lack of effective system integration or extensive system 
networking, and lack of compatibility in IT platforms amongst supply chain partners. Swabey 
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(2009) and Qi and Zhang (2008) stated that IT infrastructure breakdown is a risk factor. 
Millman (2007) pointed out that human error is the biggest risk to an organisation’s network 
security. 
 
Table 1 summarises all the risk factors identified through the above step and their 
categorisations.  
 
 
Table 1. The risk elements and factors associated with information flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Information delay 
 
Using different communication channels in the 
supply chain and consequently increasing the 
time of information transmission. (e.g. 
telephone, Email, EDI) 
Metters , 1997 
Supply chain partners not transmitting essential 
information on time 
Angulo et al., 2004; 
Yang 2010, 2011 
Processing documents being detained by 
government departments (e.g. customs) 
Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010; Yang, 2010. 
Shipping company not transmitting essential 
information on time 
Angulo et al., 2004 
Inaccurate 
information  
 
Lack of information security during the 
information flow 
Sharma and Gupta, 
2002 ; Finch, 2004; 
Qi and Zhang, 2008 
Information asymmetry/incompleteness Forrester, 1961; Lee 
et al., 1997; Angulo 
et al., 2004; Husdal 
and Bråthen, 2010 
Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
IT failure 
 
IT infrastructure breakdown or crash Qi and Zhang, 2008; 
Swabey, 2009; 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Unsuitable human operation on IT 
infrastructure 
Millman, 2007 
Unsuitable human operation on application 
software 
Millman, 2007 
 
Risks Associated with Physical Flow  
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There are a significant number of studies that focus on risks associated with physical flow in 
container shipping or general supply chains. These identified a number of risk factors which 
might be categorised into two groups: transportation delay, and cargo/asset loss or damage. 
Almost all the studies mentioned in this paper’s Introduction fall into this area. In addition, 
the following papers need to be mentioned.  
 
Based on a large-scale survey, Vernimmen et al. (2007) reported that over 40% of the vessels 
deployed on worldwide liner services arrive one or more than one day behind schedule. They 
found several risk factors that might cause transportation delay including bad weather at sea, 
congestion or labour strikes at the different ports of call, and knock-on effects of delays 
suffered at previous ports. Notteboom (2006) stated that transportation delay might incur 
extra logistics costs to the shippers and damage the liners’ reputations. Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) identified several risk factors; those are relevant to this context include unstable 
weather and road conditions, lack of fuel supply, and strike and other work-related issues. 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) classified several risk factors into transportation delay, 
including port capacity and congestion, port strikes, and delay at ports due to port capacity.  
 
In relation to cargo/company asset loss or damage, Husdal and Bråthen (2010) suggested that 
supply chains might be affected by accidents, engine/vehicle breakdowns, theft, and errors in 
loading (e.g., mixing hazardous and non-hazardous goods might cause explosion accidents). 
Compared to other general supply chains, Dangerous Goods (DG) transportation is a special 
risk factor in transportation industry supply chains, because a DG explosion may cause huge 
damage to the cargo, the ship, and the nearby port. Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) stated 
that terrorism and wars might lead to disruption risk. 
 
Table 2 summarises the risk factors addressed in the studies mentioned above or in the 
Introduction of this paper.  
 
 
Table 2. The risk elements and factors associated with physical flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Transportation 
delay 
Port strike Notteboom, 2006; 
Drewry, 2009; 
Husdal and Brathen, 
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 2010; Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Port congestion (unexpected waiting times 
before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging) 
Notteboom, 2006; 
Drewry, 2009; 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Port/terminal productivity being below 
expectations (loading/discharging) 
Notteboom, 2006; 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Unstable weather Notteboom, 2006; 
Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010 
Inappropriate empty container transportation  Song et al., 2005; 
Drewry, 2006; Song 
and Dong, 2011  
Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed 
schedules  
Song et al., 2005; Qi 
and Song, 2012 
oil price rise Notteboom and 
Vernimmen, 2009; 
Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010 
Cargo/asset loss or 
damage 
 
Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal 
operators’ improper loading/unloading 
operations 
Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010 
Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers Drewry, 2009; 
Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010 
Damage caused by transporting dangerous 
goods  
Talley, 1996; Husdal 
and Bråthen, 2010 
Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth 
operations  
Talley, 1996; Husdal 
and Bråthen, 2010 
Attack from pirates or terrorists Drewry, 2009; Fu et 
al., 2010; Tummala 
and Schoenherr, 2011 
 
Risks Associated with Payment Flow 
 
Previous studies identified a number of risk factors associated with payment flow and they 
might be categorised into three groups: currency exchange, payment delay, and non-payment. 
 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) pointed out that an international business might lose profit 
if the fees were paid in a weak currency. They also suggested that unrealised contract with 
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partners might lead to payment delay, and shippers going into bankruptcy or having partners 
with bad credit might lead to non-payment. Husdal and Bråthen (2010) stated that bankruptcy 
or other financial difficulties faced by one player in a supply chain might cause risks to the 
other players in the supply chain. Seyoum (2009) pointed out that if a consignee delayed or 
did not make the payment, it would have a direct impact on the consignor’s financial 
performance. Seyoum (2009, p.240) also stated that payment delay might not have any 
impact on the buyers; however, it “often creates liquidity problems for many exporting firms”. 
Chen (2008) stated that a break of trade caused by one company usually causes big losses to 
the others in the supply chain. Notably, there are several payment methods in international 
trade, e.g., Open Account, Letter of Credit (L/C), and Cash-in-Advance (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2008). Each payment method imposes different levels of risks to different parties. 
For example, an open account imposes the highest risk on the sellers. In container shipping 
business, several international contracts of sale are used, e.g. Free On Board (FOB), and Cost, 
Insurance and Freight (CIF). Under FOB, the shipping companies may not receive payment if 
the buyers go bankrupt.  
 
 Table 3 summarises the above mentioned risk factors. 
 
 
Table 3. The risk element and factors associated with payment flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Currency exchange Change of currency exchange rate during 
payment process 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Payment delay Payment delay from partners or shippers Seyoum, 2009 
Unrealized contract with partners Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Non-payment Shippers going into bankruptcy Husdal and Bråthen, 
2010; Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the 
container volume 
Chen, 2008 
Having partners with bad credit Tummala and 
Schoenherr, 2011 
 
3.1.2 Validation of Identified Risk Factors  
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As mentioned earlier, the risks identified based on the literature review were validated by 
qualitative interviews with a number of container shipping managers. During the interviews, 
the interviewees were also invited to suggest additional risks that had not been identified. 
Detailed results of the interviews are presented below.  
 
All the risk factors identified in the literature review were confirmed by the interviewees. In 
addition, a number of other risk factors were suggested. 
 
Using different communication channels was suggested as a risk factor associated with 
information flow. Using different communication channels produced un-standardised data, 
which might lead to inaccurate data input or engaging extra human resources and extra time 
in organising the data. An information manager mentioned –  
 
EDI is the most popular IT used in shipping companies ... However, there are still some 
supply chain partners cannot afford the investment of EDI, and they transmit the 
required information through other information channels such as email or telephone. 
The information transmitted through these different information channels is neither 
organised nor standardised. The disintegrated transmission of information may cause 
information delay and inaccuracy. 
 
Another risk factor suggested by the interviewees was “shippers requesting extra service 
information”.  Container shipping companies usually pay more attention to large shippers. 
However, the large shippers’ influential negotiation power sometimes creates risks associated 
with information flow to container shipping companies. For example, a large shipper may use 
its negotiation power in making unreasonable requests to the shipping company. As a 
manager explained -  
… Large shippers often request extra service, such as organising holistic logistic 
information which includes inland transportation shifts and customs clearance date.… 
Large shippers may request even forecasts of inland transportation timetable for 
several months in the future.  
 
Shippers hide cargos information was also considered as a risk factor.  In order to reduce the 
transportation fee or insurance payment, some shippers use wrong cargo information 
including declaring cheaper cargo category and declaring lighter cargo weight.  A shipping 
manager mentioned – 
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We have paid some penalties and once our ship was detained because the documents, 
for customs clearance, were inconsistent with the shipper and the process was delayed. 
The reason was that our customer [the shipper] did not inform us that the contents of 
the cargos had been changed, or even that the shipper had hid the cargo information. 
 
During the interviews, it emerged also that asset and cargo damage was a serious risk faced 
by shipping companies. As a manager explained –  
 
The majority of the cargos in freezer container transportation are fruit, high 
technology products, and chemical materials. These types of cargos need to be kept at a 
certain and stable temperature.… Sometimes the electricity failure, in ports or on ships, 
damages the high value cargos, and leads to fruit becoming decayed or high 
technology products overheated. … The risk of DG transportation could damage not 
only cargos but also ships; this is more serious than cargo damage or transportation 
delay. Sometimes, because of the DG explosion, we lose the whole ship; cargos; and 
reparations. 
 
In addition, “Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already reached the port of 
destination” was also defined as a risk factor by the interviewees. A senior manager stated –  
 
... Shippers may abandon cargos if the cargo’s value reduces during the transportation, 
we therefore cannot receive the transportation fee if the contract is under FOB. 
 
Based on the literature review and the interview results, this paper identified a total of thirty-
five risk factors under the various sub-categories of risk associated with information flow, 
risk associated with physical flow, and risk associated with payment flow. These are 
summarised in Table 4. The additional risk factors suggested by the interviewees are InfoI_4, 
InfoI_5, PhTD_6, PhCD_5, PayCE_2, and PayNP_2. They are highlighted in Italic Font. In 
order to facilitate the narrative, we use short names to code the risk elements (sub-categories). 
 
 
Table 4 Classification of risks in container shipping operations 
Risk associated with information flow 
Information Delay (InfoD) 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain and 
consequently increasing the time of information transmission. (e.g. 
telephone, Email, EDI) 
InfoD_1 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential information on time InfoD_2 
3. Processing documents being detained by government departments (e.g. 
customs) 
InfoD_3 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information on time InfoD_4 
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Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  InfoI_1 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  InfoI_2 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility InfoI_3 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information InfoI_4 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) InfoI_5 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash InfoIT_1 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure InfoIT_2 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software InfoIT_3 
Risk associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strikes PhTD_1 
2. Port congestions (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging) 
PhTD_2 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations (loading/discharging) PhTD_3 
4. Unstable weather PhTD_4 
5. Inappropriate empty container transportation PhTD_5 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, container 
revamp, unexpected demand) 
PhTD_6 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  PhTD_7 
8. Cargos being detained by customs PhTD_8 
9. Oil price rise  PhTD_9 
Asset/cargo loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations 
PhCD_1 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  PhCD_2 
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  PhCD_3 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  PhCD_4 
5. Damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity failure PhCD_5 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists PhCD_6 
Risk associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment process PayCE_1 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  PayCE_2 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers PayPD_1 
2. Unrealized contract with partners PayPD_2 
Non-Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy PayNP_1 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already reached the port of 
destination 
PayNP_2 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container volume PayNP_3 
4. Having partners with bad credit PayNP_4 
 
 
3.2 Risk Analysis and Discussion  
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Some 88 replies were returned including 62 valid replies and 26 invalid replies. The valid 
response rate is 18.13%. The following sections present the results of risk scale and risk 
mapping respectively. 
 
3.2.1 Results of Risk Scale 
 
The risk scales of the three types of risk consequences were calculated; Table 5 details their 
mean values, standard deviations, and the rankings amongst all risk factors. 
 
 
Table 5 Risk scale of all risk factors 
Risk  Financial loss  Reputation loss  
safety and security 
incident related loss 
 Risk 
scale 
S.D. Rank 
Risk 
scale 
S.D. Rank 
Risk 
scale 
S.D. Rank 
InfoD_1 7.81 5.42 32 6.66* 4.96 35 7.40 5.52 21 
InfoD_2 7.87 4.91 30 7.13 4.90 30 7.21 5.06 23 
InfoD_3 8.34 5.36 23 8.48 5.28 6 7.79 5.17 19 
InfoD_4 8.97 5.27 15 8.18 5.16 10 7.21 4.76 23 
InfoI_1 8.34 6.05 23 7.65 5.98 21 8.77 6.24 10 
InfoI_2 7.85 5.48 31 7.76 5.60 19 8.40 5.69 12 
InfoI_3 7.66* 5.12 35 7.40 5.15 25 8.16 4.89 16 
InfoI_4 8.13 5.20 26 8.15 5.52 11 8.35 5.35 13 
InfoI_5 11.44*** 6.13 2 10.61*** 6.39 1 12.08*** 6.38 1 
InfoIT_1 8.15 4.81 25 7.87 5.51 17 8.44 4.21 11 
InfoIT_2 7.73 5.16 33 7.48 5.47 23 8.19 4.76 14 
InfoIT_3 7.71 4.57 34 7.35 4.82 27 8.13 4.32 17 
Mean of risks 
associated with 
information flow 
8.33  7.89  8.35  
PhTD_1 9.65** 5.98 10 7.79 5.99 18 7.85 5.46 18 
PhTD_2 10.81*** 5.24 3 9.39** 5.72 3 8.19 4.79 14 
PhTD_3 9.00** 5.01 14 8.00 5.17 14 7.18 4.89 26 
PhTD_4 10.63*** 5.05 4 8.48 5.36 6 10.21*** 4.95 4 
PhTD_5 8.47 5.63 22 7.39 6.04 26 7.27 5.76 22 
PhTD_6 8.77 5.05 16 7.68 5.08 20 6.71 4.94 30 
PhTD_7 8.58 5.26 20 7.98 4.96 15 7.19 5.82 25 
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PhTD_8 7.89 4.75 29 7.18 5.27 29 6.65 4.79 33 
PhTD_9 14.00*** 6.31 1 8.73 5.77 5 9.03** 6.16 9 
PhCD_1 10.21*** 5.93 6 9.29** 6.31 4 9.77** 5.31 7 
PhCD_2 9.65** 5.85 10 8.48 4.92 6 9.55** 5.31 8 
PhCD_3 10.26*** 4.86 5 9.52** 5.69 2 11.42*** 5.87 2 
PhCD_4 9.37** 5.18 12 8.11 5.45 12 9.97** 5.35 6 
PhCD_5 9.85** 5.34 8 8.29 5.08 9 10.06*** 5.48 5 
PhCD_6 9.84** 5.84 9 8.03 6.22 13 11.03*** 6.01 3 
Mean of risks 
associated with 
physical flow 
9.80  8.29  8.81  
PayCE_1 10.18*** 6.44 7 7.95 6.38 16 7.69 6.42 20 
PayCE_2 8.10 5.98 27 7.10 6.57 31 6.89 6.58 28 
PayPD_1 9.21** 5.65 13 7.44 5.40 24 6.82 4.76 29 
PayPD_2 8.68 5.81 17 7.55 5.90 22 6.69 5.12 31 
PayNP_1 8.66 6.01 18 6.95 5.99 33 7.13 6.22 27 
PayNP_2 8.63 5.53 19 6.92 5.45 34 6.66 5.23 32 
PayNP_3 8.48 5.73 21 7.31 5.97 28 6.58* 5.33 34 
PayNP_4 7.94 5.12 28 7.03 5.34 32 6.58* 5.22 34 
Mean of risks 
associated with 
payment flow 
8.73  7.28  6.88 
 
Total average 9.05  7.92  8.21  
*means the risk scale is the smallest one in each consequence 
**means the risk scale is between 9 and 9.99 
***means the risk scale is greater than 10 
 
 
In respect of financial loss, the top three high-level risk factors are “oil price rise” (PhTD_9: 
14.00), “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 11.44), and “port 
congestion” (PhTD_2: 10.81). Moreover, although their respective risk scales are lower than 
the top three, there are several risk factors which are also quite high (greater than 10). These 
are “unstable weather” (PhTD_4: 10.63), “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” 
(PhCD_3: 10.26), “damage to containers or cargos due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations” (PhCD_1: 10.21), and “change of currency exchange rate 
during payment process” (PayCE_1: 10.18). The factor, “lack of information standardisation 
and compatibility” (InfoI_3: 7.66), has the least impact on shipping companies’ financial 
losses. In terms of financial losses, risk associated with physical flow is the most significant 
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one (the mean is 9.80) amongst the three categories of risks and risk associated with 
information flow is the least significant one (the mean value is 8.33).  
     
In terms of reputation loss, the top three risk factors are “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 10.61), “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 
9.52), and “port congestion” (PhTD_2: 9.39). The least significant one is “using different 
communication channels in the supply chain and consequently increasing the time of 
information transmission (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI)” (InfoD_1: 6.66). Again, the most 
significant one is risk associated with physical flow; however, the impact is not as high as 
that of financial loss (the mean here is 8.29). Risk associated with payment flow with the 
mean being 7.28 has the least impact on shipping companies’ reputation loss. 
     
In terms of safety and security incident related loss, the top three risk factors are “shippers 
hiding cargo information” (InfoI_5: 12.08), “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” 
(PhCD_3: 11.42), and “attack from pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6: 11.03). There are two 
other risk factors of which the risk scale is greater than 10.  They are “unstable weather” 
(PhTD_4: 10.21) and “damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure” 
(PhCD_5: 10.06). The risk factor, “financial crisis in the loan countries” (PayCE_2: 5.79), 
has the least impact on safety and security incident related loss. Among the three categories 
of risks, risk associated with physical flow remains in first place (the mean was 8.81) and risk 
associated with payment flow is the least one (the mean was 6.88).  
 
Notably, amongst all the risk factors, “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” 
(InfoI_5) ranks as the first in respect of two types of consequence - reputation and safety and 
security incident related loss; and the second in respect of financial loss. This suggests that 
this factor is in effect the most serious risk factor in container shipping operations. It may be 
worth mentioning that in relation to InfoI_5, a shipping manager during the interview survey 
stated -  
 
We have paid some penalties and once our ship was detained because the documents, 
for customs clearance, were inconsistent with the shipper and the process was delayed. 
The reason was that our customer [the shipper] did not inform us that the contents of 
the cargos had been changed. 
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“Oil price rise” (PhTD_9) is another important risk factor especially in respect of financial 
loss. According to Ronen (2011), fuel price rise could substantially increase the operational 
cost of a large ship as more than 75% of the operating cost is used for bunker fuel. “Damage 
caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3) and “unstable weather” (PhTD_4) are 
also notable factors since they have a significant impact on employees’ safety.  
 
PayCE_1 is the only risk associated with the payment flow factor of which the scale is greater 
than 10 in respect of financial loss consequence. An unstable currency exchange rate may be 
the main reason for this risk. During the interview survey, a shipping manager explained:  
 
The transportation fees we get are usually calculated by USD. However, some shippers 
will still pay the bills by local currency, such as euro or JPY. We need to afford the risk 
from the unstable currency exchange rate,… sometimes, it will make us lose the profit.  
 
Averaging over all risk factors in terms of their impact on financial loss, reputation loss and 
safety and security incident related loss, the result as shown in Table 5 reveals that financial 
loss is the most affected (the average is 9.05) and reputation loss is the least affected (the 
average is 7.92) with safety and security incident related loss (the average is 8.21) being in 
the middle.   
 
3.2.2 Results of Risk Mapping 
 
Risk mapping is a common method to analyse the relative importance of different risk factors 
(Waters, 2007). In a risk map, the horizontal axis represents the risk likelihood and the 
vertical axis represents the risk consequence. Each risk factor can be located in the risk map. 
As explained in Section 3 of this paper, we use RAS to derive a risk factor’s likelihood and 
consequence over all respondents.  Based on the risk scales, we divided the risk map into four 
regions: low risk region (corresponding to risk scale <5), moderate risk region (5< risk scale 
<10); high risk region (10< risk scale <15), and extremely high risk region (15< risk scale). 
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Figure 3 Financial loss risk map 
 
 
As shown in the financial loss risk map (Figure 3), the majority of the risk factors (28 out of 
35)  fall within the moderate risk region and none of the risk factors  fall within the low risk 
region or the extremely high risk region. A total of seven risk factors fall within the high risk 
region including PhTD_9, InfoI_5, PhTD_2, PhTD_4, PhCD_3, PhCD_1, and PayCE_1. 
Notably, PhCD_5 and PhCD_6, although they are in the moderate risk region, are very close 
to the boundary of the high risk region. Most of these factors belong to the category of risk 
associated with physical flow; this coincides with the earlier presented finding that, in respect 
of financial loss, risk associated with physical flow is more significant than the other two 
categories of risk. It is also worth mentioning that the risk factor PhTD_9 (oil price rise) has 
the highest risk scale and is quite close to the extreme risk region.  
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Figure 4 Reputation loss risk map 
 
 
As shown in the reputation loss risk map (Figure 4), except the risk factor InfoI_5 that falls 
within the high risk region, all other risk factors are in the moderate risk region.  
 
 
Figure 5 Safety and security incident related loss risk map 
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In the safety and security incident related loss risk map (Figure 5), five risk factors fall within 
the high risk region. These include InfoI_5, PhCD_3, PhCD_6, PhCD_5, and PhTD_4. Two 
risk factors within the moderate risk region (PhCD_4 and PhCD_1) are close to the high risk 
region.  With the exception of InfoI_5, all the other top seven risk factors in respect of safety 
and security incident related loss belong to risks associated with physical flow. This suggests 
that, in container shipping operations, the risks associated with physical flow have the most 
serious impact on safety and security incident related loss. In terms of InfoI_5, shipping 
managers can perhaps try to reduce the likelihood via strategies such as checking the 
processing document more carefully. In terms of the risk factors with high consequence and 
low likelihood, PhCD_6 and PhCD_4, insurance is of course an option for reducing the risk.  
It has also been suggested (IFW, 2011) that shipping companies may charge more fees for 
protecting the cargos travelling through high risk routes.  
 
 
4. Further Discussion 
 
This paper has used empirical data to analyse the risks faced by container shipping 
companies from a logistics perspective in relation to three different types of risk 
consequence: financial loss, reputation loss and safety and security incident related loss. 
From a logistics perspective, it was aimed at providing an inclusive view on the risks in 
container shipping operations. The research questions have been answered: a total of 35 risk 
factors have been identified and classified into three categories, namely, risks associated 
with information flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks associated with 
payment flow. Moreover, the relative importance of each factor was calculated. It is worth 
mentioning several highlights. One is that the risk associated with physical flow is the most 
important risk category among the three categories. It is recommendable that the managers, 
if the available resources are rather limited, could perhaps give priority to risks associated 
with physical flow in designing risk control policies. This finding is indeed consistent with 
some of the previous studies in this field as mentioned in the Introduction. 
 
The other highlight is that, amongst the thirty five risk factors, “shipper hiding cargo 
information” is the most serious risk factor. This reflects the shippers’ opportunistic 
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behaviour, which, has actually been recognised widely in the maritime industry. In one of 
the interviews, the interviewee explained that –  
 
We charge expensive freight and insurance for transporting expensive cargo and/or 
dangerous goods. Some shippers will hide the cargos information in order to save the 
money. This action may produce some serious consequences, such as explosion if the 
cargo is dangerous goods or cargo damage if the cargo is fragile.  
 
In recognition of this issue, the IMO proposed a regulation regarding verification of 
containers’ actual weight before loading onto a ship, and suggested that if a shipper failed to 
comply with the verified weight certificate of the containers’ gross weight, the loading of 
such containers ought to be refused.  
 
Furthermore, our research “refines” the findings, of some previous studies by placing the risk 
factors addressed therein in a full “risk picture” which was developed systematically.  For 
example, our research confirmed that empty container transportation was a risk element.  
However, the findings showed that it is not that important compared to the other risk factors: 
it ranks 22nd for causing financial loss, 26th for reputation loss, and 22nd for safety and 
security incident related loss. This may be explained by the fact that although empty 
container repositioning could incur a significant amount of costs, the shipping industry has 
long been aware of the trade imbalance and has already been prepared to accept such risk.  
Notteboom (2006) found that “port/terminal congestion” was the main source of schedule 
unreliability, followed by “port/terminal productivity below expectations”, and “unexpected 
waiting times due to weather or on route mechanical problems”.  Schedule reliability is an 
important aspect in container shipping reputation performance, transportation delay would 
undoubtedly harm shipping companies’ reputation. In putting these factors onto the full “risk 
picture” developed in our research, it is obvious that “port congestion” and “unstable 
weather” are important. However, when compared to other risk factors, “port/terminal 
productivity being below expectations” is not that important since it ranked 14th in respect of 
reputation loss.  
 
Several studies found that information asymmetry was an important issue in some supply 
chains such as retailer or manufacture (e.g. Forrester, 1961; Lee et al., 1997). However, it is 
found in our study that in the maritime context, information asymmetry among the players in 
the market is not that important: it ranked 31st for causing financial loss, 19th for reputation 
28 
 
loss, and 12th for safety and security incident related loss. As an interviewee put it in one of 
our interviews with the shipping companies – 
 
We do not really care about information asymmetry. According to 80/20 rule, 
compared to the cargo flow starting from small shippers through brokers or forwarders 
to our company, the large shippers, who can offer large scale cargo directly to us 
without brokers or forwards, are the ones with which we are really concerned. 
 
Our research results support also some previous findings, e.g., Fu et al. (2010). ). Our paper 
confirms that the pirate or terrorist attacks is an important risk element in causing financial 
loss and safety and security incident related loss; as shown in the two risk maps, it also has 
very serious risk consequence among the 35 risk factors, especially in safety and security 
incident related loss risk map. Our research findings also support Notteboom and 
Vernimmen’s (2009) findings.  It is confirmed that oil price rise is an important risk factor, 
especially for financial loss where it has the largest impact. In the financial loss risk map, the 
oil price rise is shown to have the highest likelihood and consequence. However, the 
consequences are not that important in the reputation loss risk map and in the safety and 
security incident related loss risk map. Our findings also confirm that port congestion is an 
important risk factor (Notteboom, 2006). It is found to be the third most important risk factor 
regarding both financial loss and reputation loss, and it appears in the high risk zone in the 
financial loss risk map.  In addition, our research shows that the damage to frozen cargo/ 
reefer containers has an important risk consequence in both the financial loss risk map and 
the safety and security incident related loss risk map (Tseng et al., 2012).  
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
This study presents a hierarchical classification of risks in container shipping operations from 
a logistics perspective. Risks are classified into three categories: risk associated with 
information flow, risk associated with physical flow, and risk associated with payment flow. 
Each category consists of several elements (sub-categories):  the information one consists of 
information delay, information inaccuracy, and IT problems; the physical one consists of 
transportation delay and cargo/asset damage; the payment one consists of currency exchange, 
payment delay, and non-payment. Each risk element consists of a number of risk factors and 
this paper considered a total of thirty five risk factors. The risk scales are measured by 
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multiplying risk likelihood and severity of risk in terms of three different consequences, i.e., 
financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss. 
 
Among the three categories of risks, it is found that risks associated with physical flow are 
generally more significant than those associated with information and payment flows. 
However, “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)”, that is a risk factor associated 
with informational flow, is the most serious risk factor amongst all the others in respect of all 
three types of consequences. It is interesting to note that this risk factor has never been 
addressed in any previous studies, it was suggested by the shipping company mangers during 
the interviews.  
 
In respect of financial loss, “oil price rise”, “shippers hiding cargo information (non-
declare)”, and “port congestions” are the top three risk factors. It is thus suggested that if a 
shipping company aims to minimise its financial loss caused by risk incidents, consideration 
about these factors should be prioritised. If, however, the shipping company prefers to focus 
on its reputation loss, it needs to pay more attention to “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)”, “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods”, and “port congestions” as 
they are the top three risk factors in respective of reputation loss. “Shippers hiding cargo 
information (non-declare)”, “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods”, and “attack 
from pirates or terrorists” are the top three in respect of safety and security incident related 
loss. 
 
Three risk maps are created to identify the importance of each risk factor in respect of the 
three types of risk consequences. The risk maps offer an intuitive view of the level (low, 
moderate, high, and extreme) of each risk factor and their likelihood and consequence.  
 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: 
(1) This study makes empirical contribution to the literature as no studies so far have 
approached the container shipping operational risks from a logistic perspective including 
all three flows (physical, information, payment) based on the empirical data from 
industrial experts. 
(2) It provides an inclusive and comprehensive analysis of the risks in container shipping 
operations which we believe is of importance to the shipping industry. It has not only 
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identified all the risks but also explored and analysed the relative significance of each 
factor in respect of three different risk consequences, namely, financial loss, reputation 
loss, and safety and security incident related loss.  This could provide useful insight for 
container shipping company managers and can assist them in better understanding the 
risks in their operations and in differentiating their efforts on mitigating risks. 
(3) A new method is proposed to calculate the risk scale over multiple respondents. This 
method overcomes the drawback of the simple risk scale averaging method, which may 
distort the statistic result because it includes the components obtained by multiplying one 
respondent’s likelihood with another respondent’s consequence. 
 
We suggest that further research may focus on exploring appropriate risk mitigation strategies 
and evaluating their relative performance in managing container shipping operations.  
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i It is worth pointing out that the risks faced by container shipping companies in their 
operations are different from supply chain risks in container shipping. A “supply chain risk” 
is defined as “an event that adversely affects supply chain operations and hence its desired 
performance measures, such as chain-wide service levels and responsiveness, as well as cost” 
(Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011, p. 474). In other words, supply chain risks are those which 
affected the entire supply chain.  Normally, studies on maritime supply chain risks focus on 
the risks which impact on the performance of the entire supply chain’s performance. These 
include all the players and not only one or two players such as shipping company. This paper 
addresses only the risks faced by a container shipping company, as a player in a supply chain.  
 
